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Abstract. Characterizing attacker behavior with respect to Cyber-
Physical Systems is important to assuring the security posture and re-
silience of these systems. Classical cyber vulnerability assessment ap-
proaches rely on the knowledge and experience of cyber-security experts
to conduct security analyses and can be inconsistent where the experts’
knowledge and experience are lacking. This paper proposes a flexible
attacker modeling framework that aids in the security analysis process
by simulating a diverse set of attacker behaviors to predict attack pro-
gression and provide consistent system vulnerability analysis. The model
proposes an expanded architecture of vulnerability databases to maxi-
mize its effectiveness and consistency in detecting CPS vulnerabilities
while being compatible with existing vulnerability databases. The model
has the power to be implemented and simulated against an actual or
virtual CPS. Execution of the attacker model is demonstrated against
a simulated industrial control system architecture, resulting in a proba-
bilistic prediction of attacker behavior.
Keywords: CPS · Security · Attacker Modeling.
1 Introduction
To secure systems from known and emerging threats, systems engineers and
security analysts alike need to integrate an attacker’s view of potential vulnera-
bilities into their design, development, and analysis process as early as possible.
To date, this attacker perspective activity has been largely a manual process
conducted by subject matter experts who examine a system and identify pos-
sible vulnerabilities and weaknesses. Understanding the potential threat behav-
iors and capabilities of a cyber-actor or threat agent with respect to a cyber or
cyber-physical system (CPS) is critical for risk assessment and the development
of effective security countermeasure solutions. [11] [17].
A promising way forward is the use of formal attacker models that attempt
to characterize and capture the expected behavior of attackers against a CPS.
Developing accurate attacker-models, however, is difficult due to the number
of factors that influence and encompass attacker behavior. To understand the
behavior of an attacker many questions may be asked such as “Who is the at-
tacker?”, “What resources are at the attacker’s disposal?”, and “What is the
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motivation of the attacker?”. Quantifying the answers to these questions, how-
ever, is challenging in the absence of absolute metrics and incomplete situation
awareness. To partially address these challenges, in this paper we present a novel
modular attacker modelling framework (AMF) that is: (1) capable of capturing
and quantifying complex attacker behavior and, (2) is readily extensible to in-
corporate new or emerging aspects of attacker behavior.
2 Related work
In attacker modeling, a common approach is to create a correlation model where
the designer selects a series of attacker properties such as skill level, resources, in-
tent, and motivation, and attempts to develop cumulative correlation functions
that effectively predict attacker behavior when applied to real-world attack-
ers [10]. Rocchetto et al. performed a literature search and created a six-profile
model able to effectively describe attacker profiles from the majority of cited
literature [20]. The use of this method, however, requires the user to be aware
of the skill level of the attacker. In order to apply Rocchetto’s method to a
realistic attacker model, a probability mass function is used to simulate the
non-determinism in the skillset of an unknown attacker.
Orojloo et al. [18] proposed an attack modeling approach that applied at-
tack trees to model how characteristics of a particular attack (access, knowledge
required, skill required, and level of user interaction) influence the behavior of
an attacker. While serving as an effective foundation, the attack tree method
as proposed by Orojloo requires a comprehensive perspective of the CPS which
must be created through a manual process for each CPS under consideration.
This design process becomes tedious when considering a large CPS or one with
multiple attack vectors to a single target.
A common approach to representing attacker behavior against a CPS is ap-
plication of the Markov decision process (MDP) [8, 12]. The size of the Markov
model explodes, however, when considering a large CPS with multiple nodes,
each having multiple potential actions. Markov representation also lacks the abil-
ity to clearly depict the nature of various paths an attacker may take through a
system. An alternate to the full MDP is the Partially Observable Markov Deci-
sion Process (POMDP) as in [7]. This model allows the application of the Markov
methodology while limiting the state-space of the model to a single attack-path.
We propose an alternate scheme using a one-step look-ahead formalism as a
solution.
Automation of the attack-analysis process for a complex CPS was explored
in [13], where the ADVISE method is proposed. The ADVISE method requires
as input a description of the system, a description of the adversary, a list of the
desired security metrics, and a description of all vulnerability information per-
taining to the system. In application to a real system, researching, compiling, and
organizing all vulnerability information related to a CPS is a monumental task.
Databases such as the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
(CAPEC), the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE), the Common Vulner-
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abilities and Exposures (CVE), and the Common Platform Enumeration (CPE)
have been applied to attack modeling to aid in vulnerability research [9,14]. We
propose the application of CAPEC, CWE, CVE, and CPE search engines as an
aid for the generation of a hybrid action database.
Due to the diversity of CPSs, attacker models are often defined within the
context of a specific system [5,9,14]. In this paper, we propose a modular AMF
that is capable of modeling complex attacker behavior against a full CPS and is
readily expandable to include additional aspects of attacker behavior. The au-
thors propose two components of the attacker model as novel. First, the authors
propose a formalization between an attacker profile and an attacker’s behavior
that allows the prediction of the behavior of profile-specific attackers against a
CPS. This approach allows an attacker-specific security review and aids in prior-
itizing the relevance of attacks and vulnerabilities in a CPS. Second, the authors
propose a modular scheme for describing cyber-physical system architectures as
well as the attack progression of an attacker through cyber-physical systems.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 describes the
attacker-modeling framework. A case study is explored in section 4. Section 5
summarizes the work and proposes future research directions.
3 Overview of the Attacker Model
Traditional attacker behavior is captured as a series of observations regarding
the attacker motivation and decision process. These observations are captured
in the proposed AMF as rules. A rule may be formally defined as a facet of
an attacker’s behavior which observes a cause/effect relationship between an
influencing parameter and the attacker’s actions. The proposed AMF accepts a
series of rules which together define the behavior of the attacker. The attacker
model overview in Figure 1 depicts the relationship between the attacker and the
CPS. Sample rules defining attacker behavior are implemented in modules such
as the CPS Knowledge and the Target Node Selection modules. This provides
a test-bed to explore the role and influence of individual rules on the composite
attacker decision process. This also provides a flexible framework that allows
validation of the AMF against a particular dataset where the rules the AMF
implements may be refined and calibrated to achieve a model that accurately
reflects the behavior of a known attacker or set of attackers.
Relationships between modules are characterized by connecting arrows, where
upstream modules occur earlier in the attacker decision process. The proposed
attacker model operates on a cyclical action/feedback scheme where an action
is some step the attacker performs in the attack process and feedback is any
information the attacker receives as a result of the action. The progression of
the attack through the CPS is described as the attack state. The attack state
represents a single action and is a tuple of static properties and dynamic vari-
ables. Properties are information that is static throughout the attack process
and in Fig. 1 includes the Action Database and the Attacker Profile. Variables
include information that changes as the attack progresses such as the attacker
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CPS Knowledge. The action performed for each state of the attack is a product
of all static properties and dynamic variables and is discussed further in section
3.6.
Attacker
Profile
Legend
Attacker
One-step Look-
Ahead Action
Generator
Action
Assesment
(Evaluation)
Action
Sampler
Feedback Action
Cyber-Physical System
CPS
Knowledge
Target Node
Selection
Module Variable
Action
Database
Property
Fig. 1. Attacker Model Overview
3.1 Cyber-Physical System
In the proposed attacker-modeling framework, the CPS is modeled and described
as a composition of nodes, edges, attack vectors, and entry points. A node rep-
resents a machine or other potentially vulnerable device that has functional
purpose within the CPS. An edge represents a communication link between two
nodes that may be used to transmit information, while an attack vector is any
edge that may be used for an attack. An entry point is an edge directed into
the CPS from outside the CPS that may be used by an attacker to gain access
to the system. Establishing well-formed boundaries between nodes of the CPS
and relationships between them allows a formal description of a Cyber-Physical
System. Programming tools such as SysML [1] utilize the node/edge system de-
scription scheme and may be readily integrated with the CPS design process for
attacker model automation.
3.2 CPS Knowledge
We begin with making the reasonable assumption that as the attack or probing
progresses, the attacker will begin to learn information about the target system.
This behavior is captured in the CPS knowledge module. The rules that the CPS
knowledge module implements are:
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– When starting an attack, the attacker only has knowledge of the system
entry points.
– As the attack progresses the attacker will discover new information about
the CPS.
– If a node is compromised, all nodes it is connected to are discovered and
added to the CPS knowledge.
Information about the CPS is fed into the attacker’s CPS knowledge module
as feedback. If a node is compromised it is considered owned by the attacker
and capable of performing pivoting attacks. The initial attacker CPS knowledge
is simplified for demonstration purposes, but in a more complex application
could include behaviors involving the attacker’s discovery of the target system.
More complex rules may be applied to node ownership such as defining levels of
ownership (based on privilege escalation).
3.3 Target Node Selection
When the attacker goes to perform an action against a system, the attacker
must first select a target node. The rules that the target node selection module
implements are:
– The attacker will only target nodes that exist in the attacker’s CPS Knowl-
edge.
– The attacker will not target a node if it is already compromised.
– The attacker will not target a node if the attacker has exhausted all qualified
actions against it.
– If an attacker targets a node, the attacker will not change targets until
exhausting all actions against it.
– If more than one target is valid, the attacker will select a target node at
random from amongst the valid nodes.
Several additional rules may be added to capture the tendency of an attacker to
target nodes associated with the end-goal (often referred to as the honey-pot).
3.4 Action Database
The purpose of the Action Database module is to capture behaviors influenced by
the actions available to the attacker. The action database contains descriptions
of all actions known about the CPS. Each action within the database contains
several fields of information including the action profile, the action description,
the target criteria, and a list of prerequisite actions. The action profile contains a
quantitative description of the user and use-case of the action, which is used for
quantifying a relationship between each action and the attacker profile defined
for the attacker model as discussed further in section 3.6. The action descrip-
tion is a plain-text description of how the action works in as much detail as is
possible. The target criteria defines what system(s) the action is valid against.
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The prerequisite attacks describe any actions that must be completed before this
action may be attempted.
A critical component to the viability of the attacker model is the database
population scheme. CAPEC [16], CWE [2], CVE [15], and CPE [3] are amongst
the most popular and provide different approaches to cataloguing attacks, attack
descriptions, and attack relationships. Search engines that make use of online at-
tack and vulnerability databases aid in effectively generating an action database
for the attacker model. One tool that was applied to populate the action database
for the case study in section 4 was the CYBOK tool [6], which is a literal search
engine for CAPEC, CWE, and CVE capable of generating vulnerability data for
individual queries or entire systems.
3.5 One-Step Look-Ahead Generator
The one-step look-ahead generator applies the attacker’s knowledge of the CPS
to filter out all attacks that are invalid for the current attack state. Filters are
non-probabilistic in nature and may depend on any information regarding the
current state of the attack or the description of the node. This attacker model
applies three filters.
1. The attacker will only consider actions that meet the target criteria
2. The attacker will not consider an action that has already been performed on
the target
3. The attacker will not consider an action if the edge relating the current node
to the target node is not a viable propagation path for that action
We define A as the set of all m known actions in the action database and Φ ⊆ A
as the set of actions known by the attacker. The three filters are defined as
Φtarget ⊆ Φ, Φex ⊆ Φ, and Φvect ⊆ Φ for filters 1, 2, and 3 respectively. The
set of actions that are valid for the attacker to perform in the given state of the
attack (Φvalid) are then defined by Equation 1, where the attack space can be
visualized in Fig. 2.
Φvalid = Φex ∩ Φvect ∩ Φtarget (1)
3.6 Action Assessment
When an attacker goes to select an action, characteristics about the attacker
will influence the selection of the attack. This behavior is captured in the action
assessment module. The rules applied here are:
– An attacker’s behavior is dependent on one or more primary influencing
factors.
– Actions may have properties that allow them to be correlated to attackers.
– An attacker’s attack selection decision can be predicted by evaluating the
sum of influencing factors between an attacker and an action.
The action assessment module calculates the probability of the attacker per-
forming each of the actions based on probability functions that take as operands
the attacker profile, the attack profile, and the current state of the attack.
CPS Attacker Modeling Framework 7
A
Φ
Φ
ex
Φ
target
Φ
vect
Φ
valid
Fig. 2. The intersection of action selection filters applied to the action database
Attacker Profiles and Attack Profiles Attacker profiles are a topic well
covered in literature with no recognized standards for what characteristics best
model an attacker. The purpose of an attacker profile is to capture characteris-
tics about an attacker that influence the attacker’s behavior, thereby describing
the expected behavior of the attacker. The characteristics that define the at-
tacker profile are termed attacker properties. Rocchetto et al. [20] performed a
literature review on attacker profiles for CPSs in an attempt to find a unify-
ing attacker profiling model to describe various attackers from multiple different
research studies. In conclusion, Rocchetto proposed a set of six attacker pro-
files composed of twenty-nine attacker properties that effectively described the
majority of attacker profiles in the referenced literature.
An action profile is often represented as a set of properties describing the
characteristics of the action [20]. This, however, implies linearly proportionality
to an attacker profile, which is not universally true. For example, an attacker with
a high skill set is not necessarily more likely to perform an attack that requires
a high skill set when an easier attack may succeed as well. We capture this
behavior by defining an attack profile as the profile of the attacker expected to
use that attack. Because attacker behavior is constantly changing as technology
evolves, this profiling technique may be reinforced by empirical data from records
of attack history. Collaborations such as MITRE’s ATT&CK framework [4] may
aid in assessment of current threat actors. This facilitates an attacker model that
can better emulate realistic and relevant threats by allowing the user to base the
relationship between attackers and their actions off of current attacker data.
As such, we define an attacker profile (∆) as an n-dimensional space of at-
tacker properties (δi) such that ∆ = {δ1, δ2, . . . , δn} for an attacker profile having
n properties. An example attack space can be seen in Fig. 3 where the attacker
profile and several action profiles are plotted in the 3-dimensional space. The
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probability of an attacker performing an action is a function of the distance
between the attacker profile and the action profile in n-dimensional space.
Fig. 3. An example 3-dimensional attack
space showing the attacker profile and
several action profiles
Fig. 4. Example probability mass func-
tion for a probabilistic attacker profile
against a nuclear power plant
Probabilistic Attacker Profiles In applying Rocchetto’s attacker profiles to
an attacker model it is important to note that in a real-world application one
cannot assume which attacker will be attacking a system. In order to simulate
this non-deterministic behavior, two types of attacker profiles are adopted which
are the static attacker profile and the probabilistic attacker profile. A static at-
tacker profile represents one of the six attacker profiles defined by Rocchetto
et. al. [20]. A probabilistic attacker profile may be represented as a probability
mass function (PMF) of the six profiles. The PMF is generated by assigning each
of the six attacker profiles (∆1, . . . ,∆6) a likelihood of attacking (li) such that
0 ≤ li ≤ 1.The Probability of attack of a specific attacker profile is calculated
using:
P (∆i) =
li∑n
j=1 lj
(2)
where
∑n
j=1 P (∆j) = 1. The PMF in Fig. 4 is an example probabilistic attacker
profile designed to mimic the probability of attackers against a nuclear power
plant. At the beginning of the attack analysis process, the probabilistic attacker
profile is sampled to obtain a discrete attacker profile which is recognized as the
attacker for the remainder of the attack process.
Attack Probability Functions The probability that the attacker will perform
an attack at any given time is calculated using the attack probability function.
Attacker properties may be one of three types which are sets, bounded ranges,
and unbounded ranges. Non-ordered sets are considered to have a scaled property
value γ = 1 if the attacker profile property and the attack profile property match
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and γ = 0 otherwise. Ordered set values may be mapped to the scaled property
range (0 ≤ γ ≤ 1) using Fuzzy set theory as demonstrated by Patil et al. in [19].
Bounded ranges are numerical ranges where the value of a property (ε) may
only fall between a lower bound (εL) and an upper bound (εH). Bounded ranges
are linearly mapped to the scaled property value (γ : 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1) using:
γ =
ε− εL
εH − εL (3)
Several scaling functions exist for unbounded ranges such as the percent-
difference function, the logistic function, and the hyperbolic tangent. The value
weighting in these functions, however, is non-linear, which does not properly
scale different property values where a score considered median is represented
by a numerically large or numerically small value (>100 or <1 respectively).
Therefore, we propose converting the unbounded property values to a bounded
range by first evaluating the maximum (γmax) and minimum (γmin) values for
all actions within the database, then using the local maximum and minimum to
scale the unbounded range.
We designate the set of m available actions in the action database as A =
{A1, A2, . . . , Am}. Each action Ai (i = 1, 2, . . . ,m) has an associated set of
scaled property values Γi = {γ1i , γ2i , . . . , γni }. For a given attacker profile (∆)
with n scaled property values Θ = {θ1, θ2, . . . , θn}, the distance (di) between the
attacker and each action is calculated by the distance between the two profiles
in n-dimensional space using:
di = f(Θ;Γi) =
√√√√ n∑
j=1
1
β2j
(
θj − γji
)2
(4)
where βj is a criticality factor such that {β ∈ R|0 ≤ β ≤ 1} which increases
the distance for properties with a β < 1 criticality. The score of each action (si)
is inversely proportional to di and calculated using the function:
si = 1− di∑m
j=1 dj
i = 1, . . . ,m (5)
This equation is unique in that it calculates the inverse of the distance without
applying a nonlinear value-weighting as is observed in the inverse function or
exponential functions such as the Softmax function. According to the score for
each action, the probability that the attacker will take action Ai is calculated
using the function:
P [Ai] =
si∑m
j=1 sj
(6)
Equation (6) has the intuitive interpretation that the higher the score the at-
tacker gets for an action, the higher the probability that this action will be
chosen by the attacker.
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3.7 Action Sampler
The last module in the attacker model is the action sampler module. The action
sampler module implements the following rule: After evaluating the attacks, the
attacker is more likely to choose an attack with a high probability than an attack
with a low probability.
The action sampler receives as inputs all attacks for the target system with
their attack probability values and selects one of the actions by sampling a
weighted randomizing function (randw()) mapped to the probabilities of the set
of probabilistic actions ∆ = {Ai, P [Ai]}. This action is then performed by the
attacker against the CPS.
4 Case Study
For application of the proposed AMF, we observe the Industrial Control System
(ICS) in Fig. 5 composed of nodes and communication channels. This example
ICS is used to control a simulated exothermic continuous stirred tank reactor
(CSTR) using an NI cRIO controller. The target for the attack is the Basic
Process Control System (BPCS, N4). Control or disruption of the BPCS by the
attacker indicates a successful attack.
relationship
Programming WS 
Windows 7 Machine
(N1)
Monitoring WS 
Windows 7 Machine
(N2)
LAN
(C1)
SIS 
NI cRIO 9064
(N3)
BPCS 
NI cRIO 9064
(N4)
MODBUS
(C2)
LabVIEW RT 
NI cRIO 9063
(N5)
Interaction PC 
Windows 7 Machine
(N6)
node
attributes
(ID)
comm
(ID)
Firewall
Cisco ASA
(N7)
USB
(C4)
USB
(C4)
USB
(C4)
Cloud
(C3)
Fig. 5. Case Study ICS relational diagram
4.1 ICS Formal Description
The ICS consists of 7 nodes, each composed of key attributes included in Fig. 5.
The system is described as having 4 entry points which include N1, N2, and
N6 via infected USB and N7 via remote access. Six properties are selected as a
subset of those described by Rocchetto et al. [20] to describe the attacker and
action profiles which include Access, Finances, Knowledge, Manpower, Motiva-
tion, and Tools. Access, Motivation, and Tools are defined as set properties with
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values of {Direct, Wireless, Offsite} for Access and {Low, Medium, High} for
Motivation and for Tools. Knowledge is defined as a bounded property with a
0 ≤ Knowledge ≤ 10 range. Finances and Manpower are defined as unbounded
properties. These properties are not intended to be a holistic description of the
attacker behavior, but rather to demonstrate the principles and dynamics of the
different types of profile properties. The criticality factor is kept at unity (1) for
all profile properties. The attacker profile PMF in Fig. 4 was defined as a set of
6 attacker profiles with property values in Table 1. CAPEC, CWE, CVE, and
CPE databases were used to search for vulnerability information. The CAPEC
and CWE databases were used to identify potential attack patterns and weak-
nesses respectively, aiding in the discovery of associated CVEs. Table 2 contains
a sample profile set for the vulnerabilities found for the ICS nodes.
Table 1. Attacker profiles and property values
Profile Access Finances Knowledge Manpower Motivation Tools
Basic User Offsite 100 2 40 Low Low
Cybercriminal Offsite 1000 5 160 Medium High
Hactivist Wireless 500 6 1500 High Medium
Insider Onsite 100 7 10 Medium Medium
Nation State Offsite 1000000 9 100000 High High
Terrorist Onsite 10000 4 1000 High Medium
Table 2. Case study action profiles
ID Name Targets A F K Mp Mo T
V1 Remote Access Trojan Windows 7 Machine Offsite 0 3 20 Low Low
V2 CVE-2017-2779 Windows 7 Machine Onsite 10000 9 5000 High Medium
V3 CVE-2017-2775 Windows 7 Machine Offsite 6000 10 8000 High Medium
V4 MODBUS MITM NI cRIO 9064 - NI cRIO 9063 Onsite 50000 9 500 High Medium
V5 MODBUS DOS NI cRIO 9064 - NI cRIO 9063 Offsite 40000 6 200 High Medium
V6 Code Injection NI cRIO 9064 Onsite 100 4 300 Medium Low
V7 Watering-Hole attack Windows 7 Machine Offsite 2000 6 300 Medium Medium
V8 CVE-2014-4115 Windows 7 Machine Onsite 1200 7 800 High High
V9 CVE-2010-2568 Windows 7 Machine Onsite 10000 8 2000 High High
V10 CVE-2019-1713 Cisco ASA Offsite 5000 9 100 High Medium
A=Access, F=Finances, K=Knowledge, MP=Manpower, M=Motivation, T=Tools
4.2 Attacker Model Execution
Sampling the PMF results in the selection of the Nation State attacker. The
attacker profile is then evaluated against the CPS. Initial attacker knowledge
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assumed includes the entry vectors E1, E2, E3, and E4, along with the corre-
sponding existence of nodes N1, N2, N6, and N7. The modeling cycle in Fig. 1
begins and is repeated until either the target is reached or there are no actions
remaining for the attacker to perform. Fig. 6 shows the progression of the attack
as a POMDP, including each decision the attacker made in the attacker process
and the probability of each decision.
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Begin
E1
0.3214 0.3272 0.3513
E2 E3 E4Entry TargetSelection
V1 V7
0.3333 0.3333 0.3333
V8
0.4678 0.5322
N3N1 N4
Action
Selection
Target Node
Selection
0.3333 0.3333 0.3333
V4 V5
0.4678 0.5322
N4N1 N5
V4 V5
Action
Selection
Target Node
Selection
Action
Selection
Fig. 6. Attacker CPS Knowledge upon completion of the attack, including attack pro-
gression
4.3 Attack Review
The steps taken to complete the attack in Fig. 6 represent one of many possible
attacks that may have been performed by the attacker. The attacker was able to
compromise the CPS by exploiting three vulnerabilities. Step 1 used an infected
USB thumb-drive to gain access to the monitoring workstation. Step 2 used a
MODBUS man-in-the-middle attack to take over the SIS cRIO. Step 3 used a
MODBUS DOS attack to disrupt the operation of the BPCS.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
The Attacker Modeling Framework we present significantly builds upon exist-
ing research and injects a more theoretical foundation for system behavior and
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attacker causality models. The flexibility of the framework readily integrates a
variety of complex attacker behaviors. The proposed attack probability func-
tions quantify the influence of attacker characteristics on the attacker’s decision
process and provide probabilistic predictions for the attacker behavior.
Preliminary findings indicate that the proposed method scales well; specif-
ically with respect to the decision space of a traditional MDP or attack-tree
analysis methods which would grow exponentially. The POMDP analysis frame-
work provides manageable attack scenarios describing system vulnerabilities and
putting the attack process in the context of the CPS. The case study shows the
benefit of the attacker decision-by-decision analysis, allowing the cyber analyst
and system engineers to have deeper insights into potential vulnerability path-
ways into and through the CPS.
Proposed future work includes,
1. The implementation of additional rules defined in related literature
2. The development of a tool to aid in attack scenario design and automation
of the attack analysis process
3. Exploration of different techniques to train and calibrate the AMF
4. The application of the AMF to recorded attacker data-sets from behavioral
analysis studies
5. The integration of a penetration-testing framework such as Metasploit into
the attacker-model for analysis against a SCADA test-bed
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